1 STATE OF NEW YORK FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 2 SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF ONONDAGA 3 4 Kelly Varano, as Parent and Natural Guardian of Infant Jeremy Bohn; Shannon Froio, as Parent and Natural Guardian 5 of Infant Shawn Darling; Brenda Fortino, as Parent and Natural Guardian of Infant Julie Fortino; Marie Martin, as 6 Parent and Natural Guardian of infant Kenneth Kenyon; Jenny Lynn Cowher, as Parent and Natural Guardian of Infant 7 William Martin; Hollan Crippen, as Parent and Natural Guardian of Infant Devan Mathews; Jessica Recore, as Parent 8 and Natural Guardian of Infant Samantha McLoughlin; Laurie and Dominick Rizzo, as Legal Custodians of Infant Jacob McMahon; Jason Montanye, as Parent and Natural Guardian of Infant Kadem Montanye; and Frances Shellings, as Parent and 10 Natural Guardian of Infant Rayne Shellings, 11 Plaintiffs, 12 - against -13 FORBA Holdings, LLC n/k/a Church Street Health Management, 14 LLC; FORBA NY, LLC; FORBA, LLC n/k/a LICSAC, LLC; FORBA NY, LLC n/k/a LICSAC NY LLC; DD Marketing, Inc.; DeRose 15 Management, LLC; Small Smiles Dentistry of Syracuse, LLC; Daniel E. DeRose; Michael A. DeRose, DDS; Edward J. DeRose, 16 DDS; Adolph R. Padula, DDS; William A. Mueller, DDS; Michael W. Roumph; Naveed Aman, DDS; Koury Bonds, DDS; Tarek 17 Elsafty, DDS; Dimitri Filostrat, DDS; Yaqoob Khan, DDS; Delia Morales, DDS; Janine Randazzo, DDS; Loc Vin Vuu, DDS, 18 and Grace Yaghmai, DDS, 19 Defendants. 2.0 INDEX NO. 2011-2128 21 RJI NO. 33-11-1413 22 23 24 25

1 2 Shantel Johnson, as Parent and Natural Guardian of Infant Kevin Butler; Veronica Robinson, as Parent and Natural 3 Guardian of Infant Ariana Flores; Demita Garrett, as Parent and Natural Guardian of Infant I'Yana Garcia Santos; Kathryn Justice, as Parent and Natural Guardian of Infant Breyonna 4 Howard; Elizabeth Lorraine, as Parent and Natural Guardian of Infant Shiloh Lorraine Jr.; Laporsha Shaw, as Parent and Natural Guardian of Infant Alexis Parker; Robert Ralston, as Parent and Natural Guardian of Infant Brandie Ralston; 6 Katrice Marshall, as Parent and Natural Guardian of Infant 7 Lesana Ross; Tiffany Henton, as Parent and Natural Guardian of Infant Corey Smith; Janet Taber, as Parent and Natural Guardian of Infant Jon Taber, 8 Plaintiffs, 10 - against -11 FORBA Holdings, LLC n/k/a Church Street Health Management, 12 LLC; FORBA NY, LLC; FORBA, LLC n/k/a LICSAC, LLC; FORBA NY, LLC n/k/a LICSAC NY LLC; DD Marketing, Inc.; DeRose 13 Management, LLC; Small Smiles Dentistry of Rochester, LLC; Daniel E. DeRose; Michael A. DeRose, DDS; Edward J. DeRose, 14 DDS; Adolph R. Padula, DDS; William A. Mueller, DDS; Michael W. Roumph; Shilpa Agadi, DDS; Koury Bonds, DDS; Ismatu 15 Kamara, DDS, Keivan Zoufan, DDS, Kathleen Poleon, DDS; Sonny Khanna, DDS, Kim Pham, DDS; Doug Gardner, DDS; Gary 16 Gusmerotti, DDS, Ellen Nam, DDS; and Lawana Fuquay, DDS, 17 Defendants. 18 19 INDEX NO. 2011-7100 RJI NO. 33-11-3717 20 2.1 22 23 24 25

1 Timothy Angus, as Parent and Natural Guardian of Infant 2 Jacob Angus; Jessalyn Purcell, as Parent and Natural Guardian of Infant Isaiah Berg; Brian Carter, as Parent and 3 Natural Guardian of Infant Briana Carter; April Ferguson, as Parent and Natural Guardian of Infant Joseph Ferguson; Sherain Rivera, as Parent and Natural Guardian of Infant 4 Shadaya Gilmore; Tonya Potter, as Parent and Natural 5 Guardian of Infant Desiraee Hager; Nancy Ward, as Legal Custodian of Infant Aalyiarose Labombard-Black; Nancy Ward, 6 as Legal Custodian of Infant Manuel Laborde, Jr.; Jennifer Bacon, as Parent and Natural Guardian of Infant Ashley 7 Parker; and Courtney Conrad, as Parent and Natural Guardian of Zakary Wilson, 8 Plaintiffs, 9 - against -10 11 FORBA Holdings, LLC n/k/a Church Street Health Management, LLC; FORBA NY, LLC; FORBA, LLC n/k/a LICSAC, LLC; FORBA NY, 12 LLC n/k/a LICSAC NY LLC; DD Marketing, Inc. DeRose Management, LLC; Small Smiles Dentistry of Albany, LLC; 13 Albany Access Dentistry, PLLC; Daniel E. DeRose; Michael A. DeRose, DDS; Edward J. DeRose, DDS; Adolph R. Padula, DDS; 14 William A. Mueller, DDS; Michael W. Roumph; Maziar Izadi, DDS; Laura Kroner, DDS; Judith Mori, DDS; Lissette Bernal, 15 DDS; Edmise Forestal, DDS; Evan Goldstein, DDS; Keerthi Golla, DDS; Nassef Lancen, DDS; Wadia Hanna, DDS, and 16 Bernice Little-Mundle, DDS, 17 Defendants. 18 19 INDEX NO. 2011-6084 RJI NO. 33-11-3318 20 Motion 21 HELD BEFORE: 22 The Honorable John C. Cherundolo, Justice of the 23 Supreme Court, in and for the Fifth Judicial District, State of New York, held at the Onondaga 24 County Courthouse, Syracuse, New York, on November 17, 2011. 25

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24	Reported By:
25	reported by.

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THE COURT: All right, I think we have Small Smiles next. My intern has a sign-up sheet, if anybody who is here on Small Smiles would sign that I'm going to take a five-minute recess then we'll get going.

(Court takes a recess.)

THE COURT: You may be seated. All right, this is the Small Smiles matters. And thus far we've got three motions, at least as I can tell. And it looks like we have Mr. Higgins and at least Mr. Witz have been the most vocal about these motions. Maybe you two want to come up at least to the counsel tables for now and --

MS. MARANGAS: Your Honor, if it please the court, Theresa Marangas, I'm going to argue the severance motion, do you want --

THE COURT: The first motion we're going to do is the recusal motion.

MS. MARANGAS: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: That's one that Mr. Witz has brought, and if anyone other than Mr. Higgins and Mr. Witz want to be heard, why don't you stand up and come on up and we can also have you heard, as well.

Okay, so with that let's go with the recusal motion. I do intend to keep this on the record, so if in your arguments you would mind using the lectern so that the court reporter can catch everything that's said, just

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so that we're all on the same wavelength here. When and if a decision is made it might affect one or the other.

So Mr. Witz, you made the motion, I've read the papers, I fully understand your position, if you want to take the position at the lectern and tell me anymore that you want to tell me I'm more than happy to listen to it.

MR. WITZ: Thank you, Your Honor. Thomas M. Witz, law firm of Wilson Elser.

Your Honor, if this were any other ordinary run-of-the-mill case with Powers and Santola on the other side I wouldn't be standing before you asking you to recuse yourself. But this is not a standard run-of-the-mill ordinary case with Powers and Santola on the other side. This is a major litigation involving several, at this point we believe hundred plaintiffs, potential plaintiffs, with several dentists and companies here, and the media attention has been there over the years and strong. We have every reason to believe that that media attention is going to continue.

Given your close association with the Powers and Santola firm, I know it goes back a few years, but it's there in terms of acting as co-counsel with Mr. Higgins and some of his partners on prior cases when you were a member of the plaintiff's bar, and your formation of the New York State Trial Lawyers Association

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along with John Powers.

THE COURT: So I should be recused from all New York State trial lawyer cases, all Academy trial lawyer cases?

MR. WITZ: No, I don't believe that.

THE COURT: All those dealing with Powers and Santola?

MR. WITZ: Not even that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: How about your firm?

MR. WITZ: Absolutely not.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. WITZ: Absolutely not, Judge. I think --

THE COURT: Do you know how many cases I did for people in your firm?

MR. WITZ: I'm sure there are several. I'm sure there are several. And if it were like I said, were just the association, and it wasn't for the media attention we expect this case to have, I wouldn't be asking you to do this, Judge. I think we have an obligation to our clients to be sure that what is reported and what is reported is free of innuendo and free of scandal and that it's objective, and that's the best way for our clients to be sure, at least in the court of public opinion as they say, they're getting a fair shake.

THE COURT: At least you dropped the not qualified part that you gave to Judge Tormey, that I really didn't know anything about how to handle a case like this. So, you know, at least you dropped that in front of me, anyway.

MR. WITZ: Yes, I think after -- -

THE COURT: So it's all about the publicity and what might happen in the publicity? All right.

MR. WITZ: Exactly. That's it. And with that I'll pass the mic to Mr. Higgins.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Higgins?

MR. HIGGINS: Patrick J. Higgins for the coordinated plaintiff. Judge, we oppose this motion to recuse. What I've just heard is that under any other case this would not be grounds for recusal. There is no mandatory grounds for recusal. It appears as if the Wilson Elser defendants are picking and choosing certain cases that they don't want this Court to basically appear on.

This Court was the IAS judge. Not the part one, the IAS judge for this case, the Varano case in Onondaga County in May and June, and Wilson Elser brought an order to show cause which this Court signed, and they didn't have any problem with this Court at that point. And obviously that was a ten plaintiff case at that time.

Then they went to the Litigation Coordination Panel, they tried to get this Court off the case by requesting Judge McCarthy and Judge Aulisi, and at that time they didn't have any problem with the publicity, they didn't have any problem with this Court's experience, they didn't have any problem with any association whatsoever, so we think this motion is basically based on a tactical decision or a thought on the part of the Wilson Elser defendants.

We also note that, you know, even after this,

Judge Tormey was appointed by the LCP to be the

coordinating justice, then they went to him to try to get

you removed, as opposed to everyone knows in recusal

motions you go right to the court. So they've tried to

get this Court off this case twice by essentially going

around and not doing what's appropriate.

You know, I don't think there's any real dispute that any relationship that is seven or eight years ago is not grounds for recusal, and this Court and the Court of Appeals says that it's up to this Court to make this determination. And, you know, the Trial Academy is filled with plaintiffs' attorneys, but it's also filled with defense attorneys and, you know, it's not unusual for either defense attorneys or plaintiffs' attorneys to lecture throughout the state and teach and

do things when they reach a certain level of skill, and this Court is obviously at that level, and I don't see anything wrong with that.

In terms of publicity, there may be some bad publicity, but that's because of what these people -- the allegations are what these people were doing. The 20/20 case aired two years before the case even started.

So finally he just -- there was indication that I was co-counsel. We did try -- I did try one case in November of 2002 for the Cherundolo Bottar Law Firm, but I tried that case myself.

So we oppose this, we think it's based on tactical grounds, and we oppose it.

THE COURT: Mr. Witz, anything else?

MR. WITZ: No, Your Honor, other than to, you know, in terms of the order to show cause we presented to you earlier, that was for the severance motion. And Mr. Higgins' comment that we didn't object then, you know, you were the judge that was available to sign it, we had you sign it. It was for -- the LCP motions were made and what have you. So that's all I want to say about that and I'll defer to Your Honor at this point.

THE COURT: All right. With regard to the motion for recusal, I assume nobody else wants to be heard? I'm going to deny the motion to recuse. I've

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looked at the Corradino law case, the Court of Appeals case, which is the lead cite by Mr. Witz. I've also looked at the judicial ethics opinions. The ironic thing is I would be able to be in front of my own firm, but in Mr. Witz' opinion not in front of the Powers and Santola Two years is the waiting limit for a judge to deal with any conflicts he may have, and I am well into my, well, fifth year at this point, so I'm well beyond that. The cases you submitted are 2002 and 2003 cases. That's eight, nine years ago. I don't hardly see John Powers or Dan Santola except speaking events throughout the state, and I see hundreds of other lawyers at the same time. have nothing to do with, financially other otherwise, with the Powers and Santola law firm, haven't for many, many years, and I see nothing wrong with my continuing here as the judge in this case, given the fact that it's now been sent to me to be the coordinating judge.

So I'm going to deny the motion. You can have an exception. Mr. Higgins, if you want to prepare an order on that I'd appreciate it.

MR. HIGGINS: We'll do so, Judge.

THE COURT: So that takes care of that. And with that I will continue as the judge on the case and go on to motion number two, which would be the, I believe the motion to have pro hac vice, admission of pro hac

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vice of, as I count them, six Texas attorneys. My only question at this point is why so many, and maybe you can explain that to me, Mr. Higgins. Anybody else want to be heard on the pro hac vice? I understand that there is some agreement in place that nobody really objects. My only concern is why so many. Mr. Higgins?

MR. HIGGINS: And Judge, to answer that directly, we have thirty plaintiffs, and we have -- this is expected to be a very involved case, and basically we are intending to move the case as quickly as possible and use as many attorneys as we can, so we believe that this level of attorneys will allow the case to move quickly. If there are discovery issues we can basically, you know, have one group of Texas attorneys handle them, if another group can, or I along with the other attorneys can handle the depositions, and so we can make sure that the case does not linger and it goes forward.

You know, we also have -- there are thirty plaintiffs and their families, you know, there'll be a lot of records that have to be and have been gathered and, you know, so I think that the admission of these six attorneys would be appropriate.

I would also note that Judge Kramer has admitted four of those attorneys on May 3rd in the Angus action before it was consolidated and stayed, so really

in terms of what we're requesting, we're requesting that those four be admitted essentially again for the consolidated or coordinated actions, and that the additional two attorneys, Charles E. Dorr and James R. Moriarty be admitted, and this application is for all coordinated actions within the scope of the LCP order.

THE COURT: All right, thank you. Any comment, Mr. Witz, or --

MR. WITZ: No, Judge, we have no objection.

THE COURT: And I assume no one else does?

That being the case, I will allow admission pro hac vice for P. Kevin Lyendecker, Esquire; Richard Frankel,

Esquire; Hillary Green, Esquire; Stephen Hackerman,

Esquire; Charles Dorr, Esquire; and James Moriarty,

Esquire, to be admitted pro hac vice. If you want to submit the appropriate order, Mr. Higgins, I'll sign it.

MR. HIGGINS: I will do so, Judge.

THE COURT: All right, moving right along, two out of three. All right, number three, the notice of motion to sever, and I believe the day before yesterday we received an order to show cause. Who is going to talk about this from your side, Mr. Witz?

MR. WITZ: My partner, Theresa Marangas.

THE COURT: What's your name?

MS. MARANGAS: Theresa Marangas.

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THE COURT: Ms. Marangas, why don't you tell me about this order to show cause that kind of got us by surprise two days ago. Maybe you can tell me about that.

MS. MARANGAS: There are three orders to show The original one was brought in Schenectady County signed by Judge Kramer filed in the county clerk's office, and the papers went to Judge Kramer. Once the LCP order came out, the clerk in Schenectady was directed to transfer the file to this courthouse. transferred the file. However, my understanding is that the papers may not have been retrieved from Judge Kramer for the order to show cause so those papers remained with Judge Kramer, unbeknownst to us, until this week. Onondaga order to show cause was signed and filed with the County Clerk's Office. My understanding it's a little bit of a different procedure here, it should have been the Supreme Court Clerk's office not the County Clerk's Office, a technical oversight for which we apologize, Your Honor. The papers were express mailed to your chambers earlier this week.

 $\hbox{ The third order to show cause is the one in } \\ \hbox{ Monroe County, and that was $--$ }$

(Court reporter interrupts.)

THE COURT: Yeah, you really should come up to the podium 'cause she needs to get this on the record.

MR. HIGGINS: Judge, while Ms. Marangas is doing that, Stephen Hackerman is going to be arguing the motion to sever, is it acceptable if he joins me at the counsel table?

THE COURT: Sure. All right. Go ahead,
Ms. Marangas, I didn't mean to cut you off.

MS. MARANGAS: That's quite all right. The third order to show cause is the Monroe County one, and that was brought later on. Plaintiffs waited to actually file a suit in this case until relatively recently, and that order to show cause was done by my office on behalf of the individual defendants, dentists that we represent, which is sixteen individual dentists, to make sure that even though the LCP order directed that the three cases be brought before Your Honor, that to make sure there was consistency there was Monroe County also having a severance order to show cause pending. That order to show cause was signed, filed with the County Clerk's Office in that county.

All of this was brought to our attention earlier this week regarding whether the papers were properly filed, whether the papers were in chambers for Your Honor to consider.

We've spoken to Mr. Higgins, a letter was circulated to all parties yesterday, we've agreed to

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stipulate that the Monroe County order to show cause, the decision on that by Your Honor would be binding on all three severance motions that are pending before you, so I consider it a moot issue as long as Your Honor is willing to entertain the motion this morning.

THE COURT: All right. You have no problem with that, Mr. Higgins?

MR. HIGGINS: I don't, Judge. I'd just like to say that the Monroe County motion to sever was brought by notice of motion, not order to show cause. Subject to that we so stipulate.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. WITZ: Your Honor, with regard to the Monroe County motion, notice of motion, I can just add a little bit to what happened there. We did file the motion here in Onondaga under -- with the Monroe County caption, and that was sent back to us because the clerk here didn't understand why it was coming to them as opposed to Monroe, so we refiled it. And then I got a call from the clerk's office indicating that your chambers had instructed that we refile the motion, the notice of motion with the clerk, so we drafted a letter to the clerk explaining the situation, and that's why I think it came to you so late, 'cause it did get sent back with instructions to us to do something different so

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that's what we did.

THE COURT: Got it.

MR. WITZ: I just wanted to add that.

THE COURT: So I will entertain all motions for severance at this time, which I assume are pretty standard, the same across the board. But go ahead, I'm sure Ms. Marangas will correct me if I'm wrong in that understanding.

MS. MARANGAS: No, Your Honor, you're correct, and good morning and thank you for entertaining our motions today, it's a privilege to be here. We represent sixteen individual --

THE COURT: You should tell Mr. Witz to say that.

MR. WITZ: For the record, Your Honor, it's a privilege to be here.

THE COURT: Quite the greeting I got from him.

MS. MARANGAS: Thank you, Your Honor. We represent sixteen individual dentists in the three different cases that have been brought in Upstate New York. Our individual dentists did not conceive or implement the alleged fraud scheme as owners and/or executors of FORBA, so there is not a common nucleus of facts that applies to our clients in this case, and severance at this time in the very early stage of the

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case is imperative to prevent them being prejudiced in this action by going forward with discovery and potential trial when the action should be severed. It's appropriate based on prior case law in medical malpractice cases where cases are brought by a group of plaintiffs against an individual doctor and a hospital because they were all treated at that facility. Severance at an early stage is appropriate in this case because of the potential prejudicial effect.

Specifically in regard to plaintiffs' action meeting the threshold under CPLR Section 1002 for permissive joinder, these actions do not arise out of the same transaction, occurrence or series of occurrences. The treatment occurred on different dates and before different dentists. The treatment was according to each individual plaintiff's presentation at the clinic, and the dentist had different tenures at the clinic in some cases. Many of the cases they don't even overlap. The prejudicial effect, if I may speak on that for a moment, Your Honor, severance of the claims is critical when multiple and distinct claims are made and there is a resulting potential for jury confusion.

Now the argument could be made, rightly so, by some of the parties, severance belongs down the road.

And in some circumstances that would be appropriate.

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However, not in this circumstance and not for our individual dentists. The potential for jury confusion is clearly a significant issue. And we're not by any means waiving that issue by bringing it at this point in time.

We're actually looking to avoid that.

And the potential for judicial economy also applies to that same argument. There will be motions made in this case. There will be motions made by individual dentists against individual plaintiffs, and there will be discovery in this case that doesn't belong being meshed together. There can be some creative way to address discovery and save time for the parties while there is still a severance in place early on in the case. There's enough creative minds in this courtroom that I'm sure can sit down and agree to some joint discovery while still having severance in place.

We're not looking to eliminate or say that judicial economy is not a factor in this case, it's always a factor, and we're here to convey that that factor, along with the potential for prejudice against our clients, warrants the severance at this early stage.

Each plaintiff's claims of malpractice must be weighed on their own merits without the potential for compounding factors of multiple claims. Joinder at this stage will cause confusion. In fact, in one of the cases

from Monroe County the plaintiff, Brandie Ralston, was not treated by any of the five dentists that we represent in this case, yet she's brought allegations against them.

(Court reporter interrupts.)

MS. MARANGAS: I'll make the statement again,
Your Honor, if I may. Specifically, Brandie Ralston has
brought allegations against five defendants, individual
dentists that we represent in the Monroe County case and,
in fact, she never treated with any of them. Clearly
joinder of those actions at this time is improper.

The failure to sever will require the parties to engage in complicated motion practice. It would clearly be simpler if the plaintiffs assert their specific claims against the specific dentists that they believe committed the alleged tortious acts.

Anticipating potential trials in this case, there's no clear lines as to what discovery will then become admissible. There is going to be substantial motions in limine and substantial potential confusion to the jury and crossover if there is not severance at this time.

The LCP order directs coordination, not joinder or consolidation. The scheduling of depositions in this case will be much more complicated if the cases remained joined.

For these reasons, and based on the cases cited

in our papers, we respectfully request that severance on behalf of the individual dentist to prevent the highly prejudicial fact at this early stage in the case is appropriate. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Higgins, or -MR. HIGGINS: Yes, Stephen Hackerman is going
to be arguing the opposition.

THE COURT: Mr. Hackerman?

MR. HACKERMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. I'm Steve Hackerman, law firm of Hackerman and Frankel. It's a pleasure to be here and to be in front of Your Honor.

THE COURT: Oh.

MR. HACKERMAN: You have a lovely courtroom. This is a grand place to work I would expect.

Let me -- fundamentally I've got two points. First, the cases are properly joined under the joinder rules; and second, the motion is really premature.

As to the first point, let me first say that Ms. Marangas, through the papers and this morning, has struggled to find some reason why there is prejudice or some problem in deferring, deciding the severance issue until after discovery. And what I hear is that while we've got confusion, and I know this is what they said in their papers, we've got confusion and disorder 'cause we've got plaintiffs who have sued dentists in this case,

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the way it is in the complaint, who didn't treat them, and that is just not correct. The way the -- it's an incorrect reading of the complaint.

And I don't have the Monroe County complaint, I just brought one, but they're all basically done the same This is the Varano case, which is an exhibit to other pleading, and if you look at paragraph 155 in that Varano complaint, which we have a paragraph in the complaint for each of the ten plaintiffs, in each of the three cases, and in paragraph 155, that's Jeremy Bohn, that's the individual paragraph we've already -- Jeremy. And it says in paragraph 155 that he received treatment from obviously the Syracuse Clinic, but from dentist Bonds, Aman and Khan that was below the standard of care, and that he is asserting claims against the Syracuse Clinic and the force of defendants, but only against defendants, dentists Bonds, Aman and Khan. And in the amended complaint there are nine -- in Varano there are nine dentists, defendants, but he has specifically identified the dentists against which he is asserting claims. So the suggestion that there is some problem here that needs to be dealt with in order to avoid confusion and disorder because plaintiffs have asserted claims against dentists that didn't treat them is just incorrect because that's not happened.

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Now I don't have the -- I can't remember the name of the plaintiff that was mentioned.

VOICE: Brandie Ralston.

MR. HACKERMAN: I don't have that one in front of me because I didn't bring that complaint, but I'm going to be surprised if it asserts claims against dentists that didn't treat Brandie, because that's not the way we drafted these complaints.

With regard to the issue, the prematurity issue, there really can't be any real issue here with regard to whether these cases were properly joined. I say that because, number one, most of the defendants didn't bring a motion to sever in the first place. secondly, the dentists who did in their reply papers and their reply affirmation say that they are okay with joint -- with consolidation of these cases for discovery. And that's at paragraph four, I think, of Mr. Witz' affirmation. Defendants also do not oppose consolidation of these matters for discovery purposes. So if the cases are appropriate for consolidation, which is fundamentally what a joint joinder is in the way that we have filed the case, that can only be because the cases satisfy the joinder requirements, and there is just no objection to these cases being treated on a consolidated basis, at least through discovery. And if we're going to do that,

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and I would submit to Your Honor there is plenty of good reason to do that, and I'll talk about that in a minute, but if it's going to be -- first of all, what's the point of severing these out and then consolidating them back. It doesn't seem to make any sense to me. And if the cases are properly consolidated for discovery, which they obviously are, since there is no objection to that then there is plenty of time to decide whether -- how the cases are going to be tried, whether they're going to be more than one case tried together, or whether they're going to be severed, to what extent they would be severed for trial purposes. And that is a decision that obviously is much better made after discovery, after the motion practice has focused the issues and developed the issues in a way that whether -- we'd like to think we can see it all right now. But I've been around this business a long time and it, unfortunately it sometimes changes, and exactly where we're going to be after we get done with discovery, what the evidence is going to show, what the motion practice is going to develop by that time, is clearly going to inform the Court as to how the cases should be tried, and at that time that's the proper time to be deciding a motion for severance as it relates to the trial.

And that's the sensible teaching of the Allen

case, which we cited in our memorandum, which is a Fourth Department 2004 case. It involved, I think, ninety-five plaintiffs, a toxic discharge from a plant allegedly causing injury to all ninety-five plaintiffs. And the Court did just what I just described, which was fundamentally conclude that the discovery, the development of the case, which shed great light on how the cases should be tried, and the motion to sever was premature and so dismissed it without prejudice to bring it back.

I'll say from our point of view, I really shouldn't speak from the Court's point of view and what you'd like to see before you decide a motion to sever for trial purposes, I'll say from our point of view it's hard for us to suggest how the cases ought to be tried until we see how the evidence and the law develops. And so we're reluctant even at this time to say that all the cases ought to be tried together, or ten of them ought to be tried together, or three of them, or whatever. We just don't feel like we're in a position to be making that suggestion from our side, and the development of the case will help immensely in that regard.

Now with regard briefly to just the question of whether the cases are properly joined, and I'll be -- in the first place I'll be brief on that because as I say,

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there doesn't seem to me to be any objection to treating these cases on a consolidated basis through discovery, and that would only be the case if they should, if they're properly joined in the first place. On this issue we're kind of like ships passing in the night. There's a lot of argument by those who have brought the motion, but they don't address what our claims are. Αt no point do they make reference to the twenty-five paragraphs that start, I think, in paragraph 155 of our complaint in the Varano case. I'm sorry, paragraph -- I think it's paragraphs 56 through 80, which set forth the allegations that's central and fundamental to everyone of these plaintiffs' claims, and that is that the defendants engaged in an illegal profit scheme that damaged, the result of which was damage to each one of the plaintiffs. All of the thirty plaintiffs damaged by the same course of conduct. Damaged by the same illegal profit scheme.

We've got twenty-five paragraphs, as I say, describing why we believe that, and it's in detail, and at no point do the defendants who brought this motion suggest why that's not -- the fact it does not satisfy the same occurrent status, the same series of occurrent status of common issues. Obviously the common issues revolve around the course of conduct, the illegal scheme. Did the defendants engage in an illegal scheme that

damaged each of the plaintiffs. That's the fundamental question. There would be all kinds of fact questions underlying that question, but that will be the ultimate question, obviously the common question.

The common legal question would be, for example, if FORBA directed an illegal profit scheme that damaged each of these plaintiffs, are they legally responsible. That would be the legal question, and there would be a lot of, I'm sure, various reasons why the defendants might suggest that the answer to that is no. Obviously we say it's yes, but that's the common legal question that runs through all of these cases, and so the common questions of fact in law are going to be there, they predominate. So we think the cases are properly joined in the first place, they satisfy the rules. We've cited the cases in our — in our brief.

I will say, just briefly, as to the cases that the defendants have brought the motion have cited, many of those cases weren't properly joined in the first place. They didn't satisfy the joinder rules. None of those cases had any significant common issues that were identified by the Court, and certainly none of them were based, as this is, on a claim that the injury to each of the plaintiffs that were joined was caused by the same course of conduct, same illegal profit scheme as we have

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here. There is no such claim in any of those cases.

And I would add on that score, Your Honor, that in none of those cases did the parties agree that the case was proper for consolidation, at least through the discovery stage. And as I say, the reason is there weren't any common questions in those cases, at least of any significance, and clearly that's not the case here.

It is our -- a fundamental claim that in our case that these defendants participated in this scheme, and that that scheme caused injury to every one of the plaintiffs in this case. So we think the motion should be denied.

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

Ms. Marangas, anything else?

MS. MARANGAS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Why don't you come on up.

MS. MARANGAS: The scheme that is referred to relates to Medicare fraud scheme, and that scheme involved FORBA, and not individual defendants. The individual defendants will, again, be highly prejudiced by this broad brush that's being applied to all the cases staying together at this time. The individual dentists are entitled to have the claims that plaintiff is seeking brought against them individually, and to know the allegations and then to refute those allegations on an

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individual basis.

They plead malpractice in these cases. The malpractice actions are separate and distinct for each individual plaintiff. Based on that alone the cases should be severed. The fraud scheme relates to the owners of the clinics and the executives of the clinics who profited off of that.

The discovery in this case can go forward, as I said, with some coordination, as the LCP order directs, and as the parties can come to an agreement on, but there is no reason at this time not to sever the claims for the individual dentists to prevent that highly prejudicial effect of plaintiffs' broad based allegations just being asserted against all of my client's. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

Mr. Hackerman, anything else?

MR. HACKERMAN: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I've had a chance to review the papers submitted with regard to the motions and order to show cause to severance, asking for severance in this matter. Does anyone else want to be heard before I make a ruling on this?

MR. HULSLANDER: I wrote a letter --

THE COURT: Mr. Hulslander, if you're going to

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talk why don't you come up to the podium, say whatever you'd like.

MR. HULSLANDER: I wrote a letter to the Court, Judge, and I stated my position. And actually, you know, frankly I agree with both parties here. It's premature to rule on this motion. I have no -- we've already got an order coordinating discovery, you're in charge of that, and it's way too early at this point to decide severance. Every time Ms. Marangas said well, you should decide it now, she talked about well, how it's going to be prejudicial in front of a jury. And frankly I agree that at some point we'll be making a motion for severance, and I agree that the case law supports severance, and I think ultimately the case should be severed. And it's about prejudice, not so much judicial economy, but I think that it's inappropriate at this stage to decide this motion, and if you do decide it I ask that you decide it without prejudice so that it can be renewed at the conclusion of discovery when it's the right time to bring it. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. Anybody else?

MR. FIRST: Judge, Dennis First. I just want
to state on behalf of my client I agree with what

Mr. Hulslander said, that at this point the issue of
severance is premature. It's not -- it's not

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appropriately before the Court because the issues really haven't been developed to the point where the Court can decide on a rationale basis. I just want to state that for the record, that's our position.

THE COURT: Anybody else?

MR. HELMER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Helmer?

MR. HELMER: I represent two of the individual defendants, Doctor Hanna and Kroner, and I agree with Mr. Hulslander and Mr. First's position. There may be --very well may be an appropriate time for this motion, but not now, and I would just like to reserve our rights to bring that motion at another time if necessary and appropriate, and not be prejudiced by the early bringing of the motion now. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. Anyone else? All right. Having heard the arguments and having reviewed the papers submitted to the Court, this Court is in agreement with the fact it's too early to decide ultimate issues of severance in this case. This case was sent to this Court by the Litigation Coordination Panel by order dated September 1, 2011. In front of the Litigation Coordination Panel this very issue was brought up, and as determined by them they made the determination that there are and/or could be common questions and issues of fact

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and law which would require this Court to have all of the items coordinated together, and discovery proceed together. That order and decision distinctly talked about the fact that there was a disagreement at that time, and a request for severance at that time, and they requested it not be coordinated because of many of the issues that Ms. Marangas has set forth here, and that court decided that all cases should be coordinated.

I don't believe that at this time the cases should be severed. I think there are questions that are presented that really are not resolved, whether there are any issues which are not common issues of law and fact to be presented, and I think that is something that has to be deferred to a later time, and will be deferred to a later time during the course of discovery and thereafter.

This case has been referred to me for purposes of coordination, and at this point not trial, so we will pursue the coordination of the discovery in this case pursuant to the order of the Litigation Coordination

Panel, and I will use that as a guide to go forward from here with regard to their decision and order and my role as the assigned coordinating justice in this case.

So the motion of the defendants as presented by Ms. Marangas here is denied, subject to renewal at a later time, at which point any and all other defendants

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will have the right to make such motions and have such motions decided at a time after discovery is complete.

And Mr. Higgins, I'll ask you to prepare the appropriate order. I've asked you to do the other two, you might as well do three of them.

MR. HIGGINS: That's fine, we'll do so.

THE COURT: All right. Having dealt with the three motions and the orders to show cause, I think the next step here is to discuss, if we can, where we go from here.

One of the issues that I want to make sure now is that any stays that are or have been in effect are now lifted. And I will so order that and ask Mr. Higgins to include that in the order that we just discussed.

And having gone from that let's now go to the conference that we have proposed to have, and I guess my first question that I have, obviously we have a large number of attorneys here, Mr. Higgins, how many total plaintiffs' attorneys are there with regard to all of these cases?

MR. HIGGINS: There are six.

THE COURT: Okay. And I'm assuming that --

MR. HIGGINS: Seven.

THE COURT: Seven? Okay, is that a -- who's going to be the lead spokesperson for the plaintiffs?

MR. HIGGINS: Judge, I will be, and I'll be working with my Texas counsel.

THE COURT: With regard to all of the defendants, has there been any discussion about who would be lead spokesperson for the defendants, at least for purposes of these discussions?

MR. WITZ: There really hasn't, Your Honor. We did have a conference amongst defense counsel last week, and then again with the plaintiffs. At that time
Mr. First had taken the lead.

MR. FIRST: I'd be happy to play that role certainly today. We hadn't talked about that --

THE COURT: Why don't you come on up,

Mr. First, and join Mr. Witz at counsel table. And I

guess what I'm going to ask the defendants to do,

obviously not today, although maybe it's a good time with

everybody here today, but maybe if you can, the two of

you, Mr. Witz and Mr. First, and Ms. Marangas, I don't

know whether you'd be part of this or not, but maybe you

can pick maybe three other attorneys from the defense

group to act as coordinating defense counsel in this

matter so that when there are meetings that we need to

deal with discovery and other issues that rather than

having a lot of people we can have maybe six on each

side, or maybe even less if we can pare it down to less,

to talk for the group as a whole, with the understanding that that coordinating panel would at least -- committee would at least communicate and get all of the input from all of the other counsel with regard to those items of discovery that we need to discuss. So if you maybe after today's meeting can sit down and if we can limit the numbers to five or six on each side so that if there are issues that we need to have counsel meet and confer about you can do that with the five or six of you together across from the table and coordinate the discovery issues that way without me being involved in each and every one of them, to the extent we can agree on those things that would be great, to the extent that we cannot I'm here willing to step in.

I think there's been some suggestion that we might want to meet at least monthly for purposes of that, I'm agreeable to do that. If we have five or six people on each side who want to come to those meetings so that we can make sure we're streamlined, we can do that.

But I think the first thing we need to do is form a committee on each side so that that committee can speak for the group, maybe have one or two spokespeople from that committee who will be speaking for the group as we go forward on some of the discovery issues, which may or may not be a lot of issues as we get forward into

them, but going that way.

I'm looking at Mr. Higgins' letter of November 15th, and while I do not intend to go fully point by point, one issue that we probably should talk about is the style of the case. Right now we have three separate huge captions. Any ideas on how to make that a little simpler so we don't have to deal with all that?

MR. HIGGINS: May I, Judge?

THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Higgins.

MR. HIGGINS: Patrick J. Higgins for the coordinated plaintiffs. We have suggested that a single caption entitled In re Small Smiles Litigation, with the three index numbers that have been assigned by the Onondaga County clerk's office, would be a suitable caption. If there are later joined actions then we can just, you know, put a single line on a second page. This way we wouldn't have, you know, fifteen pages per caption. And I think we have suggested that and, you know, that's consistent with how these types of cases are handled in other jurisdictions.

THE COURT: Any objection to that?

MR. FIRST: I think there is no objection, and certainly in principle to having a designation In re is one way to do it. Et al. is another way to do it and have the, you know, the three actual actions, just adopt

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maybe the first case. Either way is okay. I don't think there's any objection in principle to doing that.

THE COURT: All right, let's caption or style the case In re Small Smiles Litigation. That will include all claims that have been brought to date, and as additional claims come about, if there are any such additional claims, we'll deal with those on a case by case basis and either include them in the caption or not as the case may be so that, we'll deal with that.

The next item on Mr. Higgins' list was electronic service through LexisNexis. That may very well work among counsel, and if the lead groups of each decide to do that, with everybody on board, I don't care. Obviously that would be something that you can talk about amongst yourselves. Regretfully the Court is not set up, nor can it be set up, at least right now, to do that. While we have e-mail accessibility, regrettably we need to go through the appropriate channels of filing, and then filing in the clerk's office, and they'll get it delivered to us, and without that there is no way, at least as of right now, that our courts can agree to electronic filing. So we're not going to be able to do that as far as the court is concerned.

Now if there's agreement among counsel, and only if there's agreement among counsel, I think should

that go with counsel, and I'll leave that up to you gentlemen to discuss. If you want to try to do that right now we can do it now. If you want to defer that and talk about it, I think for the purposes of right now we ought to leave everything, that everything should be filed and served as usual, unless there is agreement otherwise. And my only concern is with the Court there can be no such agreement. We have to have documents filed with affidavits of service, and if you guys agree you can do it through electronic service. Mr. Higgins, you've got something to say?

MR. HIGGINS: Yes, please, Judge, and thank you. So what I would propose then, and I certainly understand that the Court has the things available to it, but what I would propose then is that if we can do the LexisNexis service system among counsel, which would allow us at least to rather than let's say serve a paper, we could electronically file, serve back and forth, and then we can file in the traditional sense with the Court. So from the Court's perspective everything would be the same as it always was, from the parties' perspective we would be essentially uploading and serving through e-mail and things of that nature, so that would probably save a lot of time and money, so I would ask if there's any objection to that.

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MR. HULSLANDER: Yeah, there is an objection.

THE COURT: Hold on. One at a time.

Mr. Hulslander, why don't you come on up.

MR. HULSLANDER: Well --

THE COURT: Don't talk until you get up here, make sure we get you on the record.

MR. HULSLANDER: I don't really know much about LexisNexis, but from what I'm hearing, you know, I'm against it, and the reason I'm against it is I don't want to pay to file, I'm going to have to print everything anyway, the Court is — obviously they're going to have to print it for the Court. At least at this point I could be convinced otherwise, but at this point I'm against it, I don't think it's a good idea, I think we ought to do it the old-fashioned way until they can convince me otherwise.

THE COURT: Mr. Helmer, you look like you want to say something.

MR. HELMER: I may be anticipating Mr. First, but I'm linked to the party, I was only formally retained last week by Doctors Kroner and Hanna, and I mentioned during the recent conference call amongst all counsel that I was concerned about fees because I have two uninsured defendants. I can get back to the parties here, and I understand the Court's concerns, I figured we

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wouldn't be able to use this system for the Court, but if I have a couple weeks I can talk to my folks, but I am working with limited resources here, and if there is filings fees, I'm going to learn more about this, I told Mr. Frankel I would, this could be a bad thing. And, of course, we can probably work out informal ways to serve each other electronically, but at this time it's a problem, and I will address it soon.

THE COURT: All right, thanks. Mr. First?

MR. FIRST: Yes. I guess it comes down to is there an opt out on this. I mean does there have to be unanimity, or can defendants or -- it looks like the defendants, opt out and just do it the old fashioned way and others can opt in and do it by the Lexis method. I think that's what has to be decided, because there clearly is some opposition to doing that.

THE COURT: I think what we need to do here is to have those of you that want to do it through

LexisNexis agree to it, and those of you that do not will do it the good old-fashioned paper way. So the one thing I do need to be clear on and however you agree it should be in writing, signed by the parties, so that we don't have any problems later on. And everything that's filed with the Court must be in writing and must be filed in the appropriate fashion.

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MR. HULSLANDER: I'm not saying that I'm -that it's a forgone conclusion, but I've talked to
Patrick and we may be able to work this out.

THE COURT: You guys talk about it, you figure it out, okay? So that takes care of that.

I guess the next thing I want to talk about is the current status of the pleadings and the status of where we're at. And I understand that the Summons and Complaints have all been served. Mr. Higgins, why don't you give me a status update of where we are, as far as whether there are any answers that have been served yet, and/or any -- I don't believe we've got any motions to dismiss yet, I think everything's kind of been stayed. So why don't you give me an update where we're at.

MR. HIGGINS: Yes, Judge. These actions started in April of 2011 with the Angus case first in Schenectady followed by the Varano case the same day, April 14th. And then Judge Kramer in Schenectady before the coordination stayed the answering time for any defendant to answer until the motions were -- to sever were decided. This Court executed a similar order, an identical order and those stays have now been lifted. The LCP order in June, in June basically stayed the entire case until the LCP order was done. That was entered on September 1st.

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have a few defendants have answered, okay, and they are

-- that's out there. The remaining defendants have not
answered. And that is presumably because of the stays
that were in effect from Judge Kramer and this Court. So
where we are now is we also filed an amended complaint on
October 18th in the three actions, and that complaint was
only to add a corporate practice of medicine factual
statement, no new parties were added, no new causes of
action were added. So basically the time to answer that
has essentially been stayed also according to this
Court's order.

So where we have it now is I think what we're looking to do with the defendants is to try to get a uniform time to answer. There are no motions to dismiss outstanding. We did get -- on June 27th we got a single piece of paper from a pro se defendant who had answered, which appears to be an amended answer but it also says, you know, motion's dismissed but nothing's been filed. So, you know, basically as far as we can tell there's no motions to dismiss have been made, so at this point there is no stay in effect.

THE COURT: Mr. First, why don't you give me your read of what we need to do from here.

MR. FIRST: Judge, I'm one of the ones who has

not answered. I suspect there are going to be quiet a few motions to dismiss made, to dismiss one or more of the causes of action.

THE COURT: I suspect from what I heard from Ms. Marangas there might be.

MR. FIRST: So I guess we need to establish a time frame for that. I think the real issue of dispute, I think that the parties, between the defendants and the plaintiffs, they've kind of agreed on a time frame, but there's a dispute over whether the CPLR stay of discovery, which applies automatically when there is a motion to dismiss, would apply. We have suggested giving the parties until January 13, 2010 (sic.) to answer, or move to dismiss, and apply the CPLR stay.

The reason why the CPLR stay is in there because presumably when motions to dismiss are decided the issues will be narrowed, maybe, or if they're not narrowed you know they're not narrowed. So it makes sense to apply the stay, and that's why it's in. I don't think, and I don't want to speak, of course, for Pat or the plaintiffs' group, but I don't think they really oppose that as a deadline, but they have expressed some opposition to the stay. So I think that's roughly where it's at.

THE COURT: Well, let me just say this,

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Mr. Higgins, before you have anything else to say. I am a judge that doesn't like stays. And my experience is that there really isn't a lot of benefit to staying discovery or other issues while motions are pending, except in certain cases, which I will address by a one-by-one case. So I am not about to stay anything for motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment generally, okay.

I'm a little bit concerned about the first series of motions here, because there may be some named defendants who may have an absolute right to get out, and maybe it would be a waste of time to go through some discovery. So I think what I intend to do is to set February 9th as a return date for any motions to dismiss. Working back from that, we should have at least ten days to get the final reply papers in, so that maybe we can work our way back into December from that to get a date when answers and/or motions to dismiss would be actually And what I'm thinking about is maybe sometime like December 16th, which would be a Friday, to have any and all answers and/or motions to dismiss, or other motions made, and that responses to those motions, given that we've got the holidays between that, be had by January 7th, and that any reply papers be put in by January 21st. That way we would be in the good position

to -- I'm sorry, wait a minute. Yeah, motion papers by

December 16th, reply papers by -- I'm sorry, answering or

responding papers by January 13th, which is a Friday, I

had the wrong year, and then any reply papers by

January 27th, which is a Friday, and then our motions

will be heard on February 9th.

Okay, so for purposes then of answers and motions, let's get everything in by December 16th on those issues, okay? Anybody got any problem with that schedule? Looks like nobody has a problem. Okay, we'll go with that schedule.

Now, in between that there will be some discussions that I do want to have certainty that exist. And Mr. Higgins had indicated that there was a confidentiality order that's been circulated, or is being circulated, and there are issues that deal with a master discovery set of plaintiffs, and I think we already talked about that, maybe the coordinating committees can get together and discuss so that we can talk about it in January. The idea is going forward with discovery. What I'd like to do is to have you, first of all, choose your committees, meet and confer with each other by January 13th so that maybe during the week of January 23rd we can either have a telephone conference or an in-person conference with those persons on the

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committees to see where we are as far as an agreed discovery schedule and time line. That doesn't mean we'll be getting actually into a whole lot of discovery between now and the motions to dismiss dates, at least we can set it up, everybody can either agree or not agree with it, we can figure out what to do it by the end of January, so you can report to me by January, I think it was the 23rd, the last date in January.

MR. WITZ: 27th.

THE COURT: 27th.

MR. WITZ: 27th.

THE COURT: So maybe you can get me a report in writing by then so that we can, on February 9th when we do have the arguments we can have everybody reconvene here, at least the lead committees on each side, and those of you that want to come in addition to that we can reconvene here, look at the proposed discovery schedule and determine where we need to go from there.

Mr. Higgins, you want to comment on that?

MR. HIGGINS: Yes, thank you, Judge. Just very briefly. We have been trying to do a lot of work basically before coming to the Court, just understanding that that's our joint task. As far as I know we do have — we have made the change to the stipulated confidentiality order, and as far as I know, and I

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appreciate anyone would tell me if I'm wrong, I believe we do have an agreement on the confidentiality order, and assuming that's correct I would like to at least submit that on notice for the Court since we have -- we had a conference call, we requested -- we had a large discussion about it and there was a request for one change to be made, we made that change, and so I think we have made some progress on that issue.

THE COURT: Great.

MR. HIGGINS: And so I would just like to submit that on notice if I could.

THE COURT: Why don't you submit it to me on notice with everybody else, if anybody has objections to that let me know within ten days from the time you get it. Otherwise I'll sign it and we'll be ready to go.

MR. HIGGINS: The other thing is we, as we sit here now there is no stay. The motions to dismiss have not been made, so obviously from the plaintiffs' standpoint we want to try to move the case as quickly as we can and efficiently all the while obviously recognizing the rights of the defendants to, you know, represent their clients. We've served Arons authorizations, we've served all of the record authorizations for all the treating dentists, all treating physicians for these children within ten days.

We're prepared to go forward with depositions five days a week on the double track, whenever this Court's ready, so

we can -- we're ready to do that.

And in terms of the stay if somebody -- there is true there is a stay under 3214, whatever, 3211, we would like to basically do as much work as we can on the case while these motions are pending, so we would like to see if we can serve, continue serving our discovery, you know, putting our case forward and see if we could get some type of an agreement from the defendants beforehand, before January 27th as to what they want from us so that we can start giving it to them. In other words, there is an agreement as to joint discovery on damages, so we'd like to start getting that out now. I don't think we have to wait till February. And, you know, if we're wrong and the case goes away, that's our nickel, it's not anybody else's nickel.

The other thing is that with respect to New FORBA, it has transmitted to the Department of Justice, we understand, approximately two-and-a-half million pages of searchable data that is ready to be searched. It's on 120 disks, and we have served our discovery response and specifically asked for that. It's gonna take us time to go through that and set up a search engine through that, so we would like, at this time, to see if we could get

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those disks and at least start the process of working through and give us something to do in the next, you know, two or three months so we don't slow down the case. I don't think they would be an objection to relevance. can't speak for Mr. Hulslander, and I certainly wouldn't presume to do so. But I would like at least to see if we could get that issue before the Court and maybe in the next fifteen or twenty days, and then at least as to that issue that would allow us to, you know, kind of ramp up and get going so that come February we've been able to move the case forward. And that's, you know, I'm just asking that we be allowed to keep moving our case forward with our discovery, that a joint -- that a joint damages at least be given to us so we can agree on that, keep moving our case and get ready to start double tracking depositions as soon as possible.

MR. HORSFALL: Andrew Horsfall. Good morning,
Your Honor. I had a conversation last week with
Mr. Hackerman about this discovery. It was produced in a
prior action down in Nashville, and my understanding is
having reviewed the notice to produce discovery requests
from the plaintiffs in October, we put the ball in the
court of our clients to determine whether or not they're
willing to consent to turn over all of that electronic
data in response to the discovery requests which were

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served in October. We don't see a problem, Kevin and I, in moving discovery forward. We want this thing to continue moving. We advised our clients of that, we're just waiting for an answer from them if they will consent to releasing that data in response to the October demands. So for now we're just waiting to hear back from them, so.

THE COURT: Well, what's your time schedule to hear back?

MR. HORSFALL: I would say a week to ten days.

THE COURT: All right. He's expecting to hear back within ten days, Mr. Higgins. If that is an agreement that they'll do that, let me know. If there is no agreement on that then let me know as well and we'll have a conference call immediately at that time and we'll figure out what to do about that.

Mr. Higgins, the other issues about getting the defendants whatever they would want from the plaintiffs, is there some sort of a discovery tool that can be used to, I would say in the Bill of Particulars but that may not be the one to do, is there some kind of a document or some kind of a standard request or some kind of a thing that can be made that might deal with each case here that might be able to be responded to that would satisfy his request?

MR. FIRST: We had a conference call with the plaintiffs and the defendants among themselves and we addressed this issue to some extent. I think there was consensus, and I'm reluctant to speak for the group because I'm not authorized to, but I think there was some consensus that on the issue of damages, injury and the like we could come up with some kind of uniform demand in terms of a Bill of Particulars and any discovery type documents that might be relevant to those issues.

On the other hand, because of the nature of the defendants, I mean ones -- there's New FORBA, Old FORBA and individual defendants, I think it would be very difficult to come up with a uniform set of demands that relate to liability. So in response to your question, Your Honor, I think we can come up with something on injury and damages, but not readily on the individual liabilities, potential liabilities.

THE COURT: All right. So if we are going to have answers and motions by December 16th, why don't we also have such demands, discovery demands as might be wanting to be served by the defendants, and we can either, you know, again, I'm going to leave it up to those of you that might be leading the committee, either agree on certain discovery tools or a group of people and/or do it individually if we don't have unanimity of

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agreement. But let's, whatever we do let's get it done, or at least get the documents served by December 16th upon the plaintiffs.

The joint documents by December? MR. FIRST: THE COURT: If there's agreement. And you've got a whole bunch of people here today, maybe you can talk to those who may be interested in joining into a joint document that can be used for each case, those that opt out. As Mr. Horsfall may indicate they might want to opt out, they can do their own. But whether you do or not do your own by December 16th, let's get something served on December 16th so that they can go about the process of getting you what you need. In the meantime maybe you can continue discussions between now and then of what you need so they can get you authorizations or Arons authorizations or whatever, they can get them to you so that you'll have all of that and you can be amassing that information between now and February.

MR. WITZ: Is that going to deter further demands down the road, Judge?

THE COURT: No. Get the initial demands out and initial demands started so you can at least get an idea on each case what the claims are from the liability standpoint and from the damage standpoint.

MR. HIGGINS: And Judge, just -- may I ask that

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with respect to -- may I ask that if there's not going to be at least a joint agreement on damages, because I think every -- there has to be uniformity on damages 'cause you've got individual children with certain damages, so I would like to be able to serve an individual discovery tool on damages on consent of the defendants, so I will work with them, you know, before that to see if we can do that. I understand about liability. If we're unable to work something out at least on damages, can we at least request a conference on that before the 16th?

THE COURT: Sure. We can do something by telephone?

MR. HIGGINS: Yes, by telephone.

THE COURT: I mean I'm not going to have thirty people on a telephone call. Two from the plaintiffs' side and two from the defense side, and we can talk about those issues.

MR. HIGGINS: The other thing is we have served discovery to the defendants, and that is that time is running, so we would ask if, you know, if we could get responses to that discovery by December 16th, the same date, 'cause that was served back in October, so I think that those answers are either due or shortly due.

THE COURT: Well, I have no idea what was served or not.

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MR. FIRST: I would object -- I'm sorry, Your Honor, I cut you off.

THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. First.

MR. FIRST: I would object to that. You know, it's rather extensive discovery, the case has been stayed. We're looking to, as Your Honor had set forth, to set a discovery schedule for January 23rd, and I think that that's when that should be addressed, when those discovery responses are due. I think we have a full plate certainly before that.

THE COURT: Well, the one thing I do want to deal with are the, whatever disks there are from New FORBA, let's get those. If they're produceable we'll get them produced, if they're not let's talk about it in ten days, and at least that will jump start whatever we need to jump start here.

As far as anything else, Mr. Higgins, I don't even know what you're talking about because I haven't seen the discovery request yet, but if we're going to have answers and motions due by the 16th, I think it's a little premature to get any other whole discovery done. I think that that's something that you might want to meet and confer with lead counsel for the defense here and figure out as part of the discovery schedule how that's going to work.

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MR. HIGGINS: Okay.

THE COURT: I'm more than willing to get involved in that. I think that to have them do anything by December 16th is premature 'cause, you know, we'll just have their answers and motions to dismiss, 3211 motions by then, so I certainly would recommend that that conversation be ongoing about discovery so that we can identify the issues and deal with the issues as we go, and hopefully we can do that with a limited number of people as opposed to the whole crew.

So we have some preliminary time schedules that we have set up here. What other issues do we need to talk about? I think it might be premature as far as trying to pick representative cases, but that's certainly something we can put on the plate at some point.

Anything else, Mr. Higgins, you want to talk about here?

MR. HIGGINS: Yes, just briefly, Judge. Some of the defendants, a small number, have served discovery to us, and I just want to clarify that that time for us to start answering that would be December 16th, so in other words we might be able to get a joint -- something joint. We don't want to answer something then find out we can do it jointly. It's a lot less time consuming for us.

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1 THE COURT: Let's see if we get agreement on 2 any previous discovery that's been served. Let's see if 3 we can get agreement to package that up as part of the whole here or if not at least we'll know not by the 16th 4 5 of December. MR. HIGGINS: Thank you, Judge. 6 7 THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Higgins, that we 8 need to deal with today? MR. HIGGINS: No. 9 THE COURT: Mr. Witz or Mr. First or 10 11 Ms. Marangas or anyone else? 12 MR. WITZ: No, sir. 1.3 MR. FIRST: No, Your Honor. 14 MS. MARANGAS: No, Your Honor. 15 MR. FIRST: Thank you. 16 All right, Mr. Higgins, as long as THE COURT: 17 you're doing the orders you want to attach a copy of this 18 transcript and put an order together, at least for the 19 preliminary order here, and we will have a report on the 20 discovery process by January 27th, did we say? 21 MR. HIGGINS: Yes, Judge. THE COURT: 27th, and then we will have our 22 23 next conference on February 9th, at the same time, or

just after we argue the motions to dismiss.

everybody's familiar with that schedule.

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MR. HIGGINS: Judge, just so I'm clear, the motions will be heard on oral argument on that date?

whoever wants to argue them orally. If you don't that's okay too. I think you might have thought by now I'm a guy who likes to make decisions quickly from the bench. I like to do my homework and get it done before I come into court. So that's why we're having the schedule set up. I no doubt will have it ready, whatever I need to have ready by the 9th, and we'll listen to oral arguments. I'm not saying that oral arguments are not worth it. Quite frankly many times I've changed my decisions because of oral arguments. But I will certainly listen to the oral arguments and make those judgments accordingly. So it's up to you whether you want to argue or not.

MR. WITZ: A time February 9th?

THE COURT: That's a motion date, why don't we set it for eleven o'clock just like we did today. We'll get those from downstate to be available to be here, and give you time to get here as well, so eleven o'clock on that date.

And gentlemen, go forward, work together, get this thing packaged up so you know what you're going to be looking for and how you're going to look for it. I

will look forward to hearing back from you. If there's any issues or anything else we need to talk about let us know. MR. WITZ: Thank you. MS. MARANGAS: Thank you. THE COURT: Let's see if we can get through it.

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CERTIFICATE

I, JUDY TRACY, RMR, Official Senior Court Reporter and Notary Public in and for Fifth Judicial District, State of New York, DO HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is certified to be a true, complete, and accurate transcript of my stenographic notes taken in the matter of In re Simple Smiles, recorded on the 17th day of November, 2011, before Honorable John C. Cherundolo, acting in and for the County of Onondaga, State of New York.

JUDY TRACY, RMR

Dated: November 18, 2011